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The relationship between recursive sentence embedding and theory-of-mind (ToM)
inference is investigated in three persons with Broca’s aphasia, two persons with
Wernicke’s aphasia, and six persons with mild and moderate Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
We asked questions of four types about photographs of various real-life situations. Type 4
questions asked participants about intentions, thoughts, or utterances of the characters
in the pictures (“What may X be thinking/asking Y to do?”). The expected answers
typically involved subordinate clauses introduced by conjunctions or direct quotations
of the characters’ utterances. Broca’s aphasics did not produce answers with recursive
sentence embedding. Rather, they projected themselves into the characters’ mental
states and gave direct answers in the first person singular, with relevant ToM content.
We call such replies “situative statements.” Where the question concerned the mental
state of the character but did not require an answer with sentence embedding (“What
does X hate?”), aphasics gave descriptive answers rather than situative statements. Most
replies given by persons with AD to Type 4 questions were grammatical instances of
recursive sentence embedding. They also gave a few situative statements but the ToM
content of these was irrelevant. In more than one third of their well-formed sentence
embeddings, too, they conveyed irrelevant ToM contents. Persons with moderate AD
were unable to pass secondary false belief tests. The results reveal double dissociation:
Broca’s aphasics are unable to access recursive sentence embedding but they can make
appropriate ToM inferences; moderate AD persons make the wrong ToM inferences but
they are able to access recursive sentence embedding. The double dissociation may be
relevant for the nature of the relationship between the two recursive capacities. Broca’s
aphasics compensated for the lack of recursive sentence embedding by recursive ToM
reasoning represented in very simple syntactic forms: they used one recursive subsystem
to stand in for another recursive subsystem.
Keywords: recursive sentence embedding, theory of mind, Broca’s aphasia, Alzheimer’s disease, compensatory
strategy
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Most linguists use a kind of inductive definition of
recursion (Tomalin, 2007; Hulst, 2010b): they define it as the
embedding of a constituent in a constituent of the same type
in linguistic expressions. Recursion builds complex structures
by increasing embedding depth whereas simple iteration yields
output structures which do not increase depth (cf. Karlsson,
2010). Watumull et al. (2014) criticize the concept of recursion
as articulated in linguistic analysis; they point out that “syntactic
embedding is a sufficient, though not necessary, diagnostic of
recursion” (p. 1). In the interpretation of our data we will extend
the concept of recursion beyond linguistic syntax to the recursive
logic of theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning.
One initial question of our research concerned the
particular source of the human faculty of recursion. It is a
debated issue whether recursivity, seen as a specific feature
of human languageand mind, is a syntactic phenomenon:
certain constituents can have the same types of constituents
embedded in them, and this operation can be repeatedpotentially
unbounded (cf. Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch et al., 2005; Rizzi, 2012),
or the source of recursion is semantics or pragmatics: complex
propositions can be expressed recursively in human languages
(cf. Evans and Levinson, 2009; Everett, 2009), or else recursion is
found in general capacities of the human mind (Jackendoff and
Pinker, 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff, 2006).
It is also a debated issue what the relationship of those
competing alternatives might be. Watumull et al. (2014) argue
that recursion is a fundamental linguistic universal. Regarding
language (in the wake of Chomsky, 1986) as I-language, they
define it as an intensional function that is a mental object,
an internal function of all human brains/minds. One of its
fundamental features is recursion, i.e., that it may generate
infinite sets. They also assign three formal criteria to the
capacity of recursion: “the computability of rules generative
of non-arbitrary sets; definition by induction enabling the
strong generation of increasingly structured expressions; and
mathematical induction for the principled (and potentially
unbounded) expansion of the generated sets of structures” (p. 6).
Corballis (2011, 2014) argues in favor of the primacy of
the recursive operation of the human mind. ToM operations
and mental time travel functions (memories of past experiences
and imagined future experiences are embedded in present
experiences and hence in one another) are operations and
functions that involve fundamentally recursive principles and
open up infinite possibilities for the mind, at least in principle.
In this view, language is based on the recursive nature of
ToM or, in a wider sense, on complex mental structures
including ToM and recursive structures of mental travel time.
Thus, recursive operations are not linguistic ones to begin
with: rather, language was adapted to the recursive operation
of the mind. The operative tool of recursion is attested in
languages (but not to the same extent in all human languages):
they are used by language wherever they are “needed,” but it
is not a specific property of language itself. Corballis (2011)
refers to Grice (1975, 1989)’s theory that it is an essential
feature of language (use) that is requires that the speaker
should have the intention to change the beliefs in the listener’s
mind, carried out by making the listener aware of that
intention. The interpretation of linguistic statements is based
on inferences rather than on explicit decoding. Note that—
granted that ToM recursion is crucial for language—in cases
where a person has deficits or limitations in his/her ToM
operations, we are to expect limitations in his/her linguistic
behavior, too, as witnessed by cases of autism (Luyster et al.,
2008).
Considering the neural basis of recursion, Friederici et al.
(2011) assumed two different computational systems dealing
with hierarchical structures: one determined by the cognitive
control for complex sequences in non-language domains, and
another one (confined to Broca’s area) which is able to
process hierarchically structured recursive sequences of artificial
and natural grammars. The first computational system is
less automatic; the second computational system is highly
automatic.
Zimmerer and Varley (2010) presented a case study in
which syntactic-structural recursion was not available for an
agrammatic aphasic participant but his mathematical skills
and ToM inferences were unimpaired. Recursive thinking
in non-linguistic cognitive domains can be unimpaired in
agrammatic aphasia. Siegal and Varley (2006) and Apperly et al.
(2006) found intact second order ToM reasoning in severe
agrammatism.
On the other hand, with respect to AD, a number of papers
discussed deficits of ToM abilities. For instance, Fernandez-
Duquet et al. (2008) found that AD persons and persons
exhibiting the behavioral variant of fronto-temporal dementia
(bFTD) faced similar difficulties in second order false belief
tasks (while in other respects they differed from one another).
Freedman et al. (2013) demonstrated significant ToM deficit in
false belief tests and in visual perspective taking. According to a
systematic review by Sandoz et al. (2014), the deficit shows up
more markedly in complex ToM tasks like second-order false
belief tasks, not independently of changes of ToM reasoning
and other cognitive processes in old age. Moreau et al. (2015)
demonstrated the presence of ToM deficit in AD persons in
tasks requiring realistic communicative interaction, too. Other
researchers (e.g., Choong and Doody, 2013) did not find ToM
deficit in AD.
1.2. The title of the present paper refers to the fact that
our case studies in syntax and ToM are concerned with
recursive subsystems, not all types of linguistic recursion. We
focus on the effect of linguistic limitations in aphasia or
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) on syntactic recursion as it appears
in the embedding of sentences. Of course, syntactic recursion
has other instances, too, like the unbounded merge of DPs;
and linguistic recursion has other, quite different aspects as
well, like the recursion appearing in the hierarchy of prosodic
phrases representing syntactic information (cf. Ladd, 1986;
Selkirk, 2009; Wagner, 2010). Schreuder et al. (2009) presented
an experiment that revealed: edge-marking processes, such
as early pitch accent placement (stress shift), are applied
recursively to phonological phrases that are embedded in another
phonological phrase. Recursive rules were found in phonotactic
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 405
Bánréti et al. Recursive Subsystems
structures. According to Hulst (2010a), “phonotactic structure
displays considerable recursion firstly at the syllable/foot level
and, secondly at the word and phrase level” (p. 335). In an
event-related brain potential (ERP) study, Honbolygó et al.
(2016) investigated prosody-syntax interaction in the case of
embedded clauses. The resulting ERP components showed
that “sentence prosody has an independent representation
characterized by abstract and most probably recursive structure”
(p. 32).
The foregrounding of abilities concerning recursive sentence
embedding was motivated by the fact that it was in this area
that we could best explore and compare the relationship between
the linguistic capacity and that for expressing ToM inferences
of aphasics and AD participants. The present case studies
concentrate on recursive subsystems that are possible in sentence
embedding and ToM inferences.
As for using term “sentence embedding,” let us take a simple
example for embedded clauses introduced by subordinating
conjunctions in potentially recursive constructions:
a) [I knew the beautiful girl.]
b) [I knew [that the beautiful girl remembered......]]
c) [I knew [that the beautiful girl remembered [that the boy
understood the gesture......]]]
Examples (b) and (c) are recursive constructions. The “......” in
the examples express that it is not restricted how many times the
formal operation of clause embedding can be executed.
With respect to ToM, we use the term embedding in the
sense of perspective embedding. What we mean by perspective
is a set of mental states associated with fictive or factual
states of affairs (Whalen et al., 2012). In perspective embedding,
one mental state is embedded within another mental state. In
principle, this can go on infinitely; in practice, however, a series
of perspective embeddings surpassing five instances begins to
become incomprehensible (Dunbar, 2000).
Sentence embedding and perspective embedding are not the
same: they constitute two distinct phenomena. Some sentence
embeddings do not involve perspective embedding, e.g.,
d) [This was my dog [that chased the cat [that ate the cheese]]].
Perspective embedding often involves increasing syntactic
complexity, including cases of clause embedding. However,
increasing syntactic complexity does not necessarily mean clause
embedding, e.g.,
e) Surprisingly, she was happy/To my surprise, she was happy.
In (each version of) example (e), one mental state is embedded
within another mental state, without clause embedding.
Furthermore, perspective embedding can be implemented
in very simple constructions, without any increase in syntactic
complexity. In our empirical case studies, linguistic data of this
kind will also be presented (cf. points 3.3. and 3.4.).
1.3. An early forerunner of the present investigation was
presented in Bánréti (2010). In that paper, only aphasic persons
were studied. Bánréti (2010) observed that, in response to
questions concerning pictures that would require recursive
sentence embedding in the answers, Broca’s aphasic persons
responded by simple, short sentences involving ToM inferences,
thus avoiding recursive clause embedding. They capitalized on
the parallelism between the semantics of ToM embeddings and
syntactic-structural embeddings in order to avoid having to
produce syntactic-structural recursion, as it were. Bánréti (2010)
came to the conclusion that such preference given to ToM
answers was based on a selective retention of the linguistic
semantic component and on the employment of mental model
constructions driven by choice of perspective and shift of
perspective, available in Broca’s aphasia, too.
In this paper, those conclusions will be reconsidered and
developed in the direction suggesting that, in fact, we have to
do with compensation strategies that work across the interfaces
of various recursive subsystems and make it possible for the
application of one recursive subsystem to compensate for
the restricted availability of another recursive subsystem. To
substantiate that point, we developed a statistical analysis and
interpretation of the results of aphasic groups of participants,
and we extended the range of participants to six persons with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), using the same tests as with the
aphasic patients. We will argue that the results show a double
dissociation of recursive clause embedding and ToM operations
across Broca’s aphasics and the AD group. We will analyze
the peculiarities of the compensatory operation of the recursive
subsystems involved.
1.4.The inclusion of AD participants in our investigations was
motivated by the fact that a number of studies had shown that
AD persons produced patterns of linguistic errors that exhibited
partial similarities and overlaps with the linguistic limitations
of aphasics. On the other hand, it was also shown that those
similarities across behavioral linguistic profiles did not go back to
the same anatomical-structural reasons. Underlying the linguistic
profile of agrammatic aphasia we find lesions of the anterior part
of the brain (e.g., Bastiaanse et al., 2011), while what we see in
cases of AD is a gradual progression of microscopic pathological
changes that start from the medial temporal lobe and spread in
various directions and in various degrees (e.g., Kempler, 2005;
Hyman et al., 2012).
Consider a few examples. Fyndanis et al. (2013) see functional
causes behind partial similarities across the linguistic profiles of
aphasic and AD persons. Injuries of quite different regions of
the brain may have similar consequences like the occurrence of
limitations in processing resources found in agrammatic aphasia
and in AD alike. It is assumed that one of the partially similar
consequences of lesions of the anterior part of the brain and
of a progression of microscopic pathological changes starting
from the medial temporal lobe is a reduction of processing
resources. Fyndanis et al. (2013) found dissociation—similar
to the linguistic symptoms of agrammatic aphasia (Bastiaanse
et al., 2011)—of three functional grammatical categories in
native speakers of Greek with mild AD: a relative retention
of subject-verb agreement and limitations in tense morphemes
on verbs and aspect markers in both sentence production
and grammaticality decisions/sentence comprehension. They
found that such limitations correlated with the degree to
which the given process or feature might be burdensome
for the processing/productive systems. For instance, operations
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with non-interpreted features are “easier” to perform than the
production or assessment of verbal tense markers and aspect
markers involving interpreted grammatical features, given that
the latter two require integration of linguistic and non-linguistic
mental representations with one another. On the other hand,
Kavé and Levy (2003) did not find such linguistic profiles with
native Hebrew mild AD persons: the found the use of both
agreement and tensemarkers fully retained. Altmann et al. (2001)
found deficits of closed-class words and morphosyntax in mild
AD native speakers of English. Bencini et al. (2011) showed
that the syntactic error patterns of AD persons also depend
on the syntactic options of their native languages. Whereas,
in the case of Italian, a language allowing grammatical covert
subjects, AD persons relatively frequently dropped the subject in
complex sentences, in the case of English where overt subjects
are required the AD subjects did not drop their subjects. The
sentence repetition performances (deficits) of two groups with
comparable MMSE scores but with different native languages, on
the other hand, were rather similar.
Ullman et al. (1997), Cortese et al. (2006), Ullman (2008),
and Walenski et al. (2009) point out that AD persons’ linguistic
limitations are mainly revealed by their erroneously producing
regular forms for lexical items with irregular morphology,
primarily due to limitations of the system of declarative memory,
while syntactic processes are retained due to their unimpaired
system of procedural memory. These data show similarities with
the linguistic profile of posterior aphasia.
Other studies have shown that in AD the retention of
syntax is coupled with semantic deficit, among other things,
in processing sentences containing non-agentive psych verbs
whose thematic structure does not follow the standard thematic
hierarchy. If thematic roles are to be assigned in the lack of
an Agent, deviations from canonical argument realization yield
limited performance (e.g., Manouilidou and de Almeida, 2009;
Manouilidou et al., 2009). Similar comprehension deficits were
also reported in Broca’s aphasia (e.g., Finocchiaro, 2002; Piñango,
2000, 2006).
Szatlóczki et al. (2015) found phonetic limitations in
spontaneous speech production already in early AD stages, along
with semantic-pragmatic limitations. Laurent and Noiret (2015)
argue that AD limitations of the visual perceptual and processing
system may affect higher level cognitive functions, including
performance in linguistic production tasks involving a visual
component.
Various studies have found a wide variety of sometimes
contradictory patterns of linguistic deficits and limitations in
AD. But as far as we know, it has not been investigated so far
how the functional linguistic limitations sketched above affect the
operations of recursive clause embedding in cases of mild and
moderate AD. This is what motivated the involvement of AD
participants in our experiments.
The experiments to be presented involved three persons
with Broca’s aphasia, two persons with Wernicke’s aphasia, six
persons with mild and moderate AD and 20+6 healthy control
participants.
2. EXPERIMENT #1: APHASIC
PARTICIPANTS
2.1. Participants
All aphasic participants had a left unilateral brain lesion.
Participants were assigned to aphasia types on the basis of CT
results and the Western Aphasia Battery (WAB) tests (Kertesz,
1982). WAB test was adapted to Hungarian by Osmánné (1991).
Information about the aphasic participants in relation to
demographical and lesion data, and the type of aphasia is
provided in Table 1.
Control Group
The healthy control participants, matched in age to the aphasic
participants, are shown in Table 2.
All participants were identified as right handed, native
Hungarian speakers.
2.2. Materials and Methods
Photographs depicting simple situations of everyday life were
selected from the Everyday Life Activities test (Stark, 1998).
The photographs were presented in a 19-inch computer screen.
TABLE 1 | Data of the aphasic participants.
Participant P.I. K.M. S.H. S.T. K.J.
Age 32 67 29 45 32
Education 12 12 11 11 11
Sex M F F M M
Handed Right Right Right Right Right
Lesion Ischaemic stroke
on the area of the
left arteria cerebri
media
Ischaemic stroke
on the area of the
left arteria cerebri
media
Left fronto-
temporo-parietal
lesion, middle
cerebral artery
infarction
Oedema of left
parietal cortex
Left temporal
haematoma of a
traumatic origin
Time post-stroke (months) 11 12 10 12 10
Aphasia Quotient (AQ) of the WAB 40.0 48.0 52.6 48.2 47.8
Diagnosis Moderate severe
Broca’s aphasia
Moderate severe
Broca’s aphasia
Moderate
Broca’s aphasia
Moderate severe
Wernicke’s
aphasia
Moderate severe
Wernicke’s
aphasia
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 405
Bánréti et al. Recursive Subsystems
TABLE 2 | Data of the control group.
Participant B.I. L.B. D.A. Sz.I. P.M. P.A. F.Gy. N.A. F.Z. K.J.
Age 54 28 22 62 28 23 71 22 42 71
Education 11 12 16 16 17 15 16 15 16 8
Sex F F F M M F M M M F
Handed Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right
Participant G.O. R.T. M.Zs. T.B. S.H. K.B. SZ.E. SZ.G. Te.J. T.J. Mean
Age 26 40 55 56 28 38 66 37 59 38 43.3
Education 16 16 16 12 12 16 16 14 16 14 14.5
Sex F F F F F F F M F F –
Handed Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right –
Two hundred and eight different pictures were used. Twenty
of these were used in a pre-test practice phase. The test was
administered in three sessions (three subtests). At least 10 days
elapsed between sessions. Each particular picture was used only
once throughout the full test procedure. The test was self-paced;
the pictures were presented one by one when the participant
pressed the space key. Three seconds after the picture appeared
on the screen, the related question was heard from a sound
file. The participant her/himself decided on the amount of time
devoted to each answer. When the answer was completed or
when the participant gave up answering, s/he pressed the space
key again. Then, a blank gray screen appeared. No evaluation or
comment was given on the answers during the test. The space key
being pressed again, the next picture appeared, and 3 s later, the
next question was heard. The structural types of questions (see
below) varied randomly within each session/subtest. Participants
were allowed to give one or several answers to each question
or they could indicate they had no answer by saying “I don’t
know.” All answers were analyzed in terms of content, relation
to the structure of the given question, grammaticality, and the
syntactic category of the construction used. The photographs
depicted everyday situation and were accompanied by questions
of various grammatical types. The types of questions involved
were as follows:
Type 1: What is X doing in the picture?
The question does not require that any of its own constituents
should be involved in the structure of the answer.
Type 2: What does X hate/like/want/ ... every afternoon/in her
office etc.?
The answer should be structurally linked to the question and
involve:
(i) a subordinate clause in direct object role, introduced
by a potentially recursive operation and signaled by a
subordinating conjunction, or
(ii) the verb of the question and its infinitival direct object, or
(iii) a definite noun phrase in the accusative.
Type 3: What may be the most entertaining/unpleasant/urgent
thing for X to do?
The answer should be structurally linked to the question and
involve:
(i) a subordinate clause in subject role, introduced by
a potentially recursive operation and signaled by a
subordinating conjunction, or
(ii) a bare infinitive subject, or
(iii) a definite noun phrase in the nominative.
Type 4: What may X be saying/thinking/reminding Y of/asking Y
to do etc.?
The structurally linked answer is
(i) an embedded clause introduced by a subordinating
conjunction, a potentially recursive construction,
(ii) a DP/NP in the accusative/or marked for other cases.
It is important to note that Hungarian Verbs like say, think,
remind, ask do not obligatorily have sentential complements.
These Verbs can have simple DP, NP complements as well.
Cf.: o˝ mondta a friss híreket “she presentedthe latest news”;
gondolt a lakás árára is “he thought of the price of the flat as
well”; emlékeztette a feladatára “she reminded him of his duty”;
segítséget kért “she asked for help”; megkérdezte a jó irányt” he
asked for the right direction,” etc.
Type 1 questions did not restrict the structure of the answer
in any way. Type 2 and Type 3 questions allowed for recursive
and non-recursive answers alike. Type 4 questions could be
answered in a structurally linked way by using embedded clause,
introduced recursively.
The research has been approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the Research Institute for Linguistics of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
(30/7/2014). All participants provided consent before
participating in the test sessions.
Our results will be analyzed by using statistical significance
tests—χ2-tests in order to investigate whether there are
significant differences in the distribution of grammatical
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FIGURE 1 | A man orders a boy to take the garbage out (Stark, 1998).
categories between two groups (i.e., a group of participants
with impairment and a group of healthy controls)-, and we will
provide the level of significance and effect size (in terms of
Cramer’s V). Analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics
software, version 22.0.0.0.
3. RESULTS
3.1. An Overview of the Patterns of
Responses by Aphasic Participants
Responses given by the five aphasic and 20 healthy control
participants have been classified in terms of whether they were
structurally linked to the questions and were or were not
grammatical.
As an example for a response that is included in “all responses”
but is not structurally linked to the question, see Figure 1.
The picture: A man orders a boy to take the garbage out.
Question:Mit mondhat az apa a fiúnak?
‘What may the father be saying to the son?’
P.I’s answer: hát a fiú-t,... a fiú-t,
well the boy-acc... the boy-acc
A possible recursive construction:
Hogy vigye ki a szemetet.
‘That he should take the garbage out.’
In what follows, we present the number of structurally linked
answers and all responses given by the participants (Broca’s
aphasics: P.I., K.M., and S.H., Wernicke’s aphasics: K.J. and S.T.)
See Table 3.
A summary of the number of structurally linked answers and
structurally not linked answers in the types of aphasia and in the
control group is given in Table 4 below.
As Table 4 showes, the ratio of structurally linked answers to
all responses decreased from the most simple Type 1 (What is
X doing?) to Type 2 and Type 3 (What does X want? and What
is the most entertaining for X?, respectively). In the case of S.T.,
the decrease was partial. With Type 4 questions (What may X
be saying/thinking/reminding Y of/asking Y to do?), the ratio of
structurally linked answers increased and for two participants
(P.I., S.T.) it turned out to be better than with Type 1 questions
and for three participants (K.J., K.M., S.H.), it was almost as good.
We found that the number of structurally linked answers
differs significantly for both Broca’s and Wernicke’s aphasics, as
compared to the control group, in the case of all question types,
that is, aphasics gave fewer structurally linked answers than the
control group did:
Broca vs. control, Type 1 questions: χ2(2, N= 1508) = 511.56,
p< 0.001, V = 0.58;
Wernicke vs. control, Type 1 questions: χ2(2, N= 1219) = 343,
p< 0.001, V = 0.53;
Broca vs. control, Type 2 questions: χ2(2, N= 1606) = 714.3,
p< 0.001, V = 0.67;
Wernicke vs. control, Type 2 questions: χ2(2, N= 1219) =
1002.77, p< 0.001, V = 0.91;
Broca vs. control, Type 3 questions: χ2(2, N= 1655) = 784.6,
p< 0.001, V = 0.69;
Wernicke vs. control, Type 3 questions: χ2(2, N= 1285) = 462.8,
p< 0.001, V = 0.6;
Broca vs. control, Type 4 questions: χ2(2, N= 1351) = 449.04,
p< 0.001, V = 0.58;
Wernicke vs. control, Type 4 questions: χ2(2, N= 1105) = 391.9,
p< 0.001, V = 0.6;
3.2. Responses to Type 1–3 Questions
In what follows, we will base our statistical analyses on
grammatically well-formed responses as a subset of structurally
linked responses. On the other hand, tables presenting
percentages will also show those of structurally linked responses,
in addition to those of grammatically well-formed ones.
For Type 1 questions (What is X doing in the picture?), most
structurally linked and grammatical answers contained Verb
Phrases. Only two participants produced a few sentences and
accusative Noun Phrases. Participants did not produce recursive
syntactic structures at all. The distribution of grammatical
categories used in the grammatical responses differs significantly
for Broca and Wernicke aphasics [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 283) = 8.72, p
< 0.05, V = 0.18].
For Type 2 questions (What does X hate/like/want/ ... every
afternoon/in her office?), most answers involved non-recursive
infinitives or accusative noun phrases. Recursive sentence
embedding was avoided. The distribution of grammatical
categories used in the grammatical responses differs significantly
for Broca and Wernicke aphasics for Type 2 questions as well
[χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 303) = 32.09, p< 0.001, V = 0.33].
For Type 3 questions (What may be the most
entertaining/unpleasant/urgent thing for X to do?) most answers
involved NP subjects or Infinitives. Participants avoided giving
recursive answers as a rule; the few clausal answers produced by
S.T., P.I., and K.M. failed to involve a subordinating conjunction.
The clausal answers produced by S.H. contained subordinating
conjunctions were structurally linked to the questions but were
not grammatical; only very few of them were structurally linked
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TABLE 3 | Numbers and percentages of structurally linked answers compared to all responses for Type 1, 2, 3, and 4 questions per participant.
Participant S.T. K.J. P.I. K.M. S.H.
Type 1 question: 61.11% 75.9% 50.54% 71.03% 57.62%
all responses/structurally linked answers 72/44 83/63 186/94 107/76 151/87
Type 2 question: 53.95% 38.46% 41.63% 61.48% 39.44%
all responses/structurally linked answers 76/41 182/70 209/87 122/75 213/84
Type 3 question: 61.76% 59.09% 38.84% 45.18% 43.33%
all responses/structurally linked answers 68/42 132/78 224/87 166/75 180/78
Type 4 question: 83.72% 50% 59.52% 66.67% 54.9%
all responses/structurally linked answers 43/36 80/40 126/75 90/60 153/84
S.T. and K.J. = Wernicke’s aphasic participants; P.I., K.M., and S.H. = Broca’s aphasic participants.
TABLE 4 | Numbers and percentages of structurally linked answers and
structurally not linked answers compared to all responses in Type 1, 2, 3,
and 4 questions, in the various types of aphasia and in the control group.
Participant Wernicke’s
aphasics
Broca’s
aphasics
Control group
Type 1 question, structurally
linked answers
69.03% 57.88% 100%
107 257 1064
Type 1 question, structurally
not linked answers
30.97% 42.12% 0%
48 187 0
Type 2 question, structurally
linked answers
43.02% 45.22% 100%
111 246 1062
Type 2 question, structurally
not linked answers
56.98% 54.78% 0%
147 298 0
Type 3 question, structurally
linked answers
60% 42.11% 100%
120 240 1085
Type 3 question, structurally
not linked answers
40% 57.89% 0%
80 330 0
Type 4 question, structurally
linked answers
61.79% 59.35% 100%
76 219 982
Type 4 question, structurally
not linked answers
38.21% 40.65% 0%
47 150 0
and grammatical as well. Comparing Broca and Wernicke
aphasics, the distribution of grammatical categories used in the
grammatical responses differs significantly for Type 3 questions
[χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 251) = 21.12, p< 0.001, V = 0.29]. See Table 5.
3.3. Responses to Type 4 Questions
Responses to Type 4 questions (What may X be
saying/thinking/reminding Y of/asking Y to do?), may require
recursively embedded clauses as answers. As Tables 3, 4 showed,
the performance of two of the participants (S.T., P.I.) involving
structurally linked answers actually turned out to be better than
with Type 1 questions (What is X doing?); for three participants
(K.J., K.M., S.H.), it was almost as good. This result flies in the
face of the expectation that building recursive structures should
be more difficult than building non-recursive ones.
Wernicke’s aphasics (S.T., K.J.) produced some conjunction-
initial descriptive clauses (that-clauses) and some simple clauses
involving the subjunctive (i.e., the mood directly indicating
subordination).
Two of the Broca’s aphasics (P.I., K.M.) did not give
embedded clauses at all, and one participant(S.H.) produced
very few. One participant (K.M.) did produce simple clauses
involving the subjunctive, a verbmood indicating potential
subordination without that-type conjunction. However, most
of the structurally linked and grammatical answers produced
by Broca’s aphasics, as well as the rest of the answers given
by Wernicke’s aphasics, were rather peculiar: they produced
statements that assumed the point of view of one of the characters
seen in the picture, rather than being purely descriptive. These
participants answered the question as if they were in the
“mental state” of the characters or as if they quoted their
words in the first person. These answers will be referred
to as “situative statements with ‘ToM’ (theory of mind)type
reasoning.” In them, the Verb was inflected in the first, rather
than the third, person singular (or second person singular, with
reference to the partner in the situation shown in the picture),
their meanings differed sharply from descriptive statements,
as they directly represented the thought or statement of the
character they “cited.” The participants imagined themselves,
as it were, to be in the psychological state of the person in
the picture, they mentally simulated and analyzed it, using
their own minds as models, and selected their conclusions
from among the states thus generated. The application of
situative statements made it possible for them to use very
brief and simple linguistic structures. Most of the situative
statements did not involve a subordinating conjunction, but
represented “ToM” type reasoning in the form of simple clauses
(It was only Wernicke’s aphasic K.J. who produced more that-
conjunction + descriptive clause answers and in whose case
simple situative statements did occur as a minority solution,
either).
3.4. Examples for the Types of Responses
to Type 4 Questions
3.4.1. Situative statement with “ToM” reasoning by Broca’s
aphasic participants. See Figure 2.
The picture: A girl is standing on bathroom scales.
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TABLE 5 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses (in brackets: those of all structurally linked responses) in the various grammatical
categories for Type 1, 2, and 3 questions per participant.
Participant S.T. K.J. P.I. K.M. S.H.
Responses to TYPE 1 questions n = (44) 36 n = (63) 45 n = (94) 67 n = (76) 68 n = (87) 67
Verb (36.36% 16) (44.44% 28) (39.36% 47) (59.21% 45) (26.44%) 34.33%
41.67 % 15 48.89% 22 55.22% 37 61.76% 42 23
Verb Phrase (63.34% 28) (34.92% 22) (42.55% 40) (39.47% 30) (16.09%) 20.9%
58.33% 21 31.11% 14 37.31% 25 36.76% 25 14
Noun Phrase+accusative case ending – (14.29% 9) (7.45% 7) 7.47% (1.32%) 1.47% –
11.11% 5 5 1
Simple sentence – (6.35%) 8.89% – – (57.47% 50)
4 44.77% 30
Responses to TYPE 2 questions n = (41) 41 n = (70) 50 n = (87) 78 n = (75) 64 n = (84) 70
Infinitive Phrase (68.29%) 68.29% (48.57% 34) (63.22% 55) (93.33% 67) (55.95% 47)
28 52% 26 58.97% 46 92.19% 59 52.86% 37
Noun Phrase +accusative case ending (7.32%) 7.32% (40% 28) (5.75%) 6.41% (8% 6) (13.1%) 15.71%
3 42% 21 5 4.67% 3 11
Verb Phrase (14.63%) 14.63% (11.43% 8) (31.03%) 34.62% (2.67%) 3.12% (13.1% 11)
6 6% 3 27 2 10% 7
Simple sentence – – – – (17.86%) 21.43% 15
Deixis (9.76%) 9.76% – – – –
4
Responses to TYPE 3 questions n = (42) 27 n = (78) 37 n = (87) 79 n = (75) 66 n = (78) 42
Infinitive Phrase (54.76% 23) (41.03% 32) (58.62% 51) (88% 66) (23.08% 18)
59.26% 16 64.86% 24 54.43% 43 96.97% 64 35.71% 15
NP-nominative case (30.95% 13) (58.97% 46) – (9.33% 7) (23.08%) 42.86%
22.22% 6 35.14% 13 0% 0 18
Simple sentence (7.14%) 11.11% – (25.29%) 27.85% (2.67%) 3.03% –
3 22 2
Verb Phrase – – (16.09%) 17.72% – –
14
Subordinating conjunction + descriptive clause (7.14% 3) – – – (53.84% 42)
7.4% 2 21.43% 9
Question:Mire gondolhat a lány?
‘What may the girl be thinking of?’
P.I.’s answer: Úristen! Ennyi kiló!
‘O my God! So much!’
A possible recursive construction:
(O˝) arra gondol, hogy hány kiló lehet
‘She is thinking of how much she may weigh.’
3.4.2. Subordinating conjunction that introduces multiple
(second order) ‘ToM’ type reasoning in response by participant
S.H. The response contains the first and second person singular
features. See Figure 3.
The picture: A boy is waking up a girl.
Question: Vajon mit mond a fiú a lánynak?
‘What may the boy be saying to the girl?’
S.H.’s answer:
Hogy..... te miért vagy szomorú, úgy érzed, fáj a
fejem, például?
‘That.....why are you sad, you can feel that I have a
headache, for example?’
A possible recursive construction:
A fiú kérdezi a lányt, hogy miért szomorú.
‘The boy is asking the girl (that) why she is sad.’
3.4.3. ‘ToM’ type reasoning by Wernicke’s aphasic participant,
see Figure 4:
The picture:A girl is showing her scar to a boy.
Question: Vajon mire gondol a fiú?
‘What may the boy be thinking of?’
S.T.’s answer:Mindjárt rosszul leszek!
‘I’m going to be sick.’
A possible recursive construction:
(O˝) arra gondol, hogy mindjárt rosszul lesz.....
‘He thinks (that) he is going to be sick.....’
3.4.4. Syntactic-structural recursion in a response by aWernicke’s
aphasic participant, see Figure 5.
The picture: A father warns his daughter that she should not
smoke
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FIGURE 2 | A girl is standing on bathroom scales (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 3 | A boy is waking up a girl (Stark, 1998).
Question: Mire figyelmeztetheti az apa a lányt?
‘What may the father be warning his daughter
about?’
K.J.’s answer: Hogy nem szabad cigarettázni, hogy az veszélyes.
‘That she should not smoke, that it is
dangerous.’
It is important to note that Type 2 and Type 3 questions also
required inferences on the mental state of the characters to
be drawn from the pictures but participants did not produce
situative statements in their responses to Type 2 and Type 3
questions.
3.5. Table 6 below shows the number of structurally linked
responses (outside the brackets: that of grammatical responses)
FIGURE 4 | A girls is showing her scar to a boy (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 5 | A father warns his daughter that she should not smoke
(Stark, 1998).
in the various grammatical categories for Type 4 questions. The
number of situative statements containing ToM reasoning in
answers to Type 4 questions is also given. These responses were
supposed to involve recursive sentence embeddings but they
contain “ToM” inferences instead. See Table 6.
The strategy outlined above was successful especially
for Broca’s aphasics. A large majority of the grammatical
responses produced by Broca’s aphasics were situative statements
containing “ToM” type reasoning. See Table 7.
The distribution of grammatical structures of structurally
linked responses shows significant differences among aphasics
and the control group [χ2-tests, Broca vs. control: χ2(3, N= 1157) =
256.23, p< 0.001,V = 0.47, Wernicke vs. control: χ2(3, N= 1058) =
152.31, p< 0.001, V = 0.38]. Also, aphasics produce significantly
fewer recursive structures than the control group [χ2-tests,
Broca vs. control: χ2(2, N= 1157) = 183.05, p < 0.001, V = 0.4,
Wernicke vs. control: χ2(2, N= 1058) = 21.01, p < 0.001, V =
0.14]. As for grammatical situative statements, their frequency is
significantly higher in Broca aphasics than in the control group
butWernicke aphasics do not differ significantly from the control
group with respect to situative statements [χ2-tests, Broca vs.
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TABLE 6 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses (in brackets: those of all structurally linked responses) in the various grammatical
categories for Type 4 questions per participant.
Participant S.T. K.J. P.I. K.M. S.H.
n = (36) 36 n = (40) 40 n = (75) 47 n = (60) 58 n = (84) 70
Simple situative statement (66.67%) 66.67% (20%) 20% (100% 75) (70% 42) (52.38%) 62.86%
24 8 100% 47 68.97% 40 44
Sentence with subjunctive mood (8.33%) 8.33% (20%) 20% – (30%) 31.03% –
3 8 18
That + situative statement (25%) 25% – – – (42.86% 36)
9 31.43% 22
That + descriptiveclause (60%) 60% – – (4.76%) 5.71%
24 4
S.T. and K.J. are Wernicke’s aphasics and P.I., K.M. and S.H. are Broca’s aphasics.
TABLE 7 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses (in
brackets: those of all structurally linked responses) in the various
grammatical categories across aphasia types and in the control group for
Type 4 questions.
Participant Wernicke’s Broca’s Control
aphasics aphasics group
n = (76) 76 n = (219) 175 n = (982) 982
Simple situative (42.11%) 42.11% (73.52% 161) (30.96%) 30.96%
statement 32 74.86% 131 304
Sentence with (14.47%) 14.47% (8.22%) 10.29% –
subjunctive mood 11 18
That + situative (11.84%) 11.84% (16.44% 36) (24.03%) 24.03%
statement 9 12.57% 22 236
That + descriptive (31.58%) 31.58% (1.83%) 2.29% (44.83%) 44.83%
clause 24 4 442
control: χ2(2, N= 1157) = 65.07, p < 0.001, V = 0.24, Wernicke vs.
control: χ2(2, N= 1058) = 0.07, p> 0.05, V = 0.005].
4. DISCUSSION
4.1.Recursive sentence embedding is impaired in Broca’s aphasia.
This is suggested by the fact thatmost of the Broca’s aphasics’
grammatical answers to Type 4 questions were simple situative
statements, andonly very few were descriptive clauses introduced
by a subordinating conjunction. The frequency of situative
statements was significantly higher in Broca’s aphasics than in
the control group. On the other hand, Wernicke’s aphasics did
not differ significantly from the control group with respect to
situative statements, and a few situative statementsbeginning
with a subordinating conjunctionwere also produced. Both
aphasic groups produced significantly fewer recursive structures
than the control group, but recursive sentence embedding was
less impaired in Wernicke’s aphasia.
The use of simple situative sentences could also be observed
in the case of the control group, but only in about a third
of their responses. All other replies they gave were recursive
structures, the answers contained syntactic subordination in
overt forms: descriptive clauses or situative statements were
intoduced by a subordinating conjunction. Therefore, recursive
sentence embedding and ToM reasoning in the form of simple
clauses represent two alternative strategies of which members of
the control groupwere able to choose at will, whereas the aphasics
were forced to choose the use of situative statements.
4.2. Bánréti (2010) was content with showing that aphasics
tend to exploit the parallel between ToM reasoning and syntactic-
structural embeddings (Sauerland, 2005) in order to avoid
syntactic structural recursion in answering Type 4 questions. See
Figure 6.
Nowwe wish to argue that more is at stake. The distribution of
grammatical structures of structurally linked responses showed
significant differences among aphasics and the control group.
These results yield arguments supporting the claim that, along
with impairments in recursive sentence embedding, recursive
ToM inferences may remain selectively unimpaired in certain
types of aphasia. By “recursion” in ToM inferences we mean
that the participants, in addition to seeing themselves as able
to infer other people’s mental states, considered other persons
(e.g., ones seen in pictures) to be able to infer further (third)
persons’ mental states, thus exhibiting recursive constructions.
The content of situative statements showed that Broca’s aphasic
participants correctly identified themselves with the mental
states of the characters in the pictures, thus complex syntactic
structural recursion was avoided. Recursive sentence embedding
was substituted for by simple clauses expressing ToM inferences.
The subset of linguistic devices indicating non-descriptive
perspective was available for the aphasic participants: ToM
statements contain the first person singular feature (instead of
the third person), the structures used were simple, sometimes
fragmented correctly, their meaning referred to simple emotions,
etc. Recursive sentence embedding, on the other hand, requires
introductory formulas, subordinate conjunctions, agreement
relations between main and embedded clauses, two propositions,
etc. to control a descriptive perspective. This linguistic subsystem
was only partially available or was not available for aphasic
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FIGURE 6 | The parallel between theory-of-mind embeddings and
syntactic structural embeddings (Sauerland, 2005).
participants. Hence, in order to compensate for the deficiency,
they resorted to another recursive subsystem.
5. EXPERIMENT #2: PARTICIPANTS WITH
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
The inclusion of AD participants in our investigations was
motivated by the fact that various studies have found patterns
of linguistic deficits in AD. See the details in Section 1.4. It has
not been investigated so far how the linguistic deficits affect the
operations of recursive clause embedding in AD. As far as we
know, the relationship between AD persons’ recursive sentence
embedding abilities and their ToM reasoning abilities have not
yet been explored systematically.
In persons with AD, as opposed to the case of aphasics, the
language faculty becomes limited gradually due to a progression
of microscopic neuropathological changes (Kempler, 2005;
Hyman et al., 2012). We assumed that in a different type of
linguistic impairment we would find a different distribution of
responses. Thus, we administered the tests presented in Section
Materials and Methods above to persons living with Alzheimer’s
disease.
5.1. Participants
The group of AD participants included 4 mild and 2 moderate
AD participants. The native Hungarian speaking AD participants
were categorized asmild vs. moderate based on the degree of their
dementia with the help of the Mini Mental State Examination
(MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975; Tariska et al., 1990) and the ADAS-
Cog test (Rosen et al., 1984). The participants met the diagnostic
requirements of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) and of ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) for AD. See some details in
Table 8.
The healthy control participants, matched in age to the AD
participants, are shown in Table 9.
5.2. Materials and Methods
Medical/clinical tests as well as cognitive tests, including
MMSE, were followed within 1 month by our own recursive
sentence embedding tests administered in three sessions (three
subtests), with at least 10 days elapsing between subsequent
occasions.
TABLE 8 | Data of the AD participants.
Participant T.I. To.Is. Zs.A. H.L. K.F. K.D. Mean
Age 75 78 55 63 72 75 69.67
Education 11 11 11 17 11 16 12.83
Sex F M F M M F –
Handed Right Right Right Right Right Right –
MMSE 24 20 25 24 15 15 20.5
Diagnosis Mild
AD
Mild
AD
Mild
AD
Mild
AD
Moderate
AD
Moderate
AD
–
TABLE 9 | Data of the control group.
Participant F.Gy. M.Zs. Sz.E. M.J. K.J. SZ.I. Mean
Age 71 55 66 78 71 62 67.17
Education 16 16 16 15 8 16 14.50
Sex M F F F F M –
Handed Right Right Right Right Right Right –
MMSE 29 30 30 29 29 30 29.5
We administered the above pictures and questions to AD
participants. For stimuli, we used the same extended test material
that was used with aphasic participants. Two hundred and
eight photos depicting situations of everyday life were selected
(Stark, 1998). We asked the four structural types of questions,
ordered randomly. See the details in Section Materials and
methods.
The research has been approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the Research Institute for Linguistics of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
(30/7/2014). All participants provided consent before
participating in the test sessions.
6. RESULTS
6.1. Some Features of Responses
Fragments were avoided, and a preference for finite Verbs was
followed. Infinitives were substituted for finite Verbs in the
responses to Type 2 questions. Some specific attitude predicates
requiring infinitive complements were avoided [utál “hate (to
do something),” szeret “like (to do something),” akar “want (to
do something),” or legszórakoztatóbb” most entertaining (to do),”
etc.] and descriptive finite verbs were used instead of infinitives.
See Figure 7:
The picture: A boy is watering flowers.
Question: O˝ mit utál?
‘What does he hate to do?’
Answer by mild AD participant: Hát locsol...virágot, rózsákat
locsolják.
‘Well, he is watering ... flowers, roses are being watered.’
6.2. Examples for the Grammatical Types
of Responses to Type 4 Questions
(a) Simple clause describing intention: Figure 8.
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FIGURE 7 | A boy is watering flowers (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 8 | A man scolds a girl (for breaking the piggy bank) (Stark,
1998).
The picture: A man scolds a girl (for breaking the piggy bank).
Question:Mit mondhat a férfi a lánynak?
‘What may the man be saying to the girl?’
Answer by mild AD participant: Oktatja valamire a lányát.
‘He is teaching his daughter about something.’
(b) Simple descriptive clause with subjunctive mood (without
that): Figure 9.
The picture: A man orders a boy to take the garbage out.
Question:Mit mondhat az apa a fiúnak?
‘What may the father be saying to the son?’
Answer by mild AD participant:Vigye ki a szemetet.
‘He should take the garbage out.’
FIGURE 9 | A man orders a boy to take the garbage out (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 10 | A girl is standing on the bathroom scales (Stark, 1998).
(c) Descriptive clause with recursive embedding (that-
clauses): Figure 10.
The picture: A girl is standing on the bathroom scales.
Question: Vajon mire gondol a lány?
‘What may the girl be thinking of?’
Answer by mild AD participant:Arra, hogy megint hízott, vagy
megint fogyott.
‘That she put on weight again, or lost weight again.’
(d) Situative statement: Figure 11.
The picture: A man is standing up from a wheelchair.
Question:Mire kérheti a férfi a no˝t?
‘What may the man be asking the woman to do?’
Answer by mild AD participant: Segíts bele ... a biciklibe!
‘Could you help me into ... into the bike?’
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FIGURE 11 | A man is standing up from a wheelchair (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 12 | A boy is waking up his father (Stark, 1998).
6.3. Relevant and Irrelevant Responses:
Examples
The responses by the AD participants were categorized from the
point of view of relevance of the content as well. The relevance of
the answer was evaluated in the context of the stimulus picture
and the question heard.
6.3.1. Responses relevant in their content and fitting in structure:
examples appear in Figures 7–11.
6.3.2. Responses not relevant in their content but fitting in
structure: an example is given in Figure 12 below.
The picture: A boy wakes up his father.
Question:Mi lehet a szándéka a fiúnak?
‘What could be the intention of the boy?’
Answer by moderate AD participant: El akar szo˝kni.
‘He wants to escape.’
6.3.3. Syntactic structural recursion with incorrect content:
Figure 13.
The picture: A girl is showing her scar to a boy.
Question: Vajon mire gondol a fiú?
‘What may the boy be thinking of?’
Moderate AD participant 1:Hát, nem tudom hogy o˝ ezért.., azt
hogy ilyen nagyra akar no˝ni o˝ is.
‘Well, I don’t know that he therefore...that he wants to grow
this big, too.’
Moderate AD participant 2:
A fiú el van szomorodva, valami olyat mondott neki a lány,
hogy elszomorodott, esetleg hogy nem szereti.
FIGURE 13 | A girl is showing her scar to a boy (Stark, 1998).
FIGURE 14 | A man is giving a flower to a woman (Stark, 1998).
‘The boy is sad, the girl told him something that made him
sad, perhaps she said she did not love him.’
6.3.4. Incorrect assignments of thematic roles: Figure 14.
The picture: A man is giving a flower to a woman.
Question:Mire gondolhat a férfi?
‘What may the man be thinking of?’
Answer by moderate AD participant: Hogy milyen alkalomra
kapta a virágot.
‘What kind of occasion he got the flower for.’
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6.4. Grammaticality of Responses by AD
Participants
Most of the responses by mild AD participants and moderate AD
participants were grammatical, see Table 10.
As Table 10 shows, most of the responses to Type 1–4
questions were grammatical.
6.5. Responses to Type 4 Questions: Mild
AD Participants
Responses by mild AD participants to Type 4 questions in terms
of grammatical categories are shown in Table 11.
Comparing the distribution of recursive responses to Type 4
questions, statistical analysis shows that there is no significant
difference between the group of mild AD participants and the
control group [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 220) = 1.76, p > 0.05, V = 0.09].
The same is true for situative and non-situative statements [χ2-
test, χ2(3, N= 220) = 3.3, p > 0.05, V = 0.12]. The results suggest
that in mild AD participants recursive sentence embedding is
not affected. As to individual members of the AD group, the
pattern of Zs.A.’s responses was different: she produced fewer
that-clauses and more situative statements than other mild AD
participants did in responses to Type 4 questions.
TABLE 10 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses (in brackets: those of all structurally linked responses) for Type 1, 2, 3, and 4 questions
per participant.
Participant T.I. To.Is. Zs.A. H.L. K.F. K.D.
Mild Mild Mild Mild Moderate Moderate
Type 1 97.87% 98% 98% 100% 97.5% 100%
question (47) 46 (50) 49 (50) 49 (52) 52 (40) 39 (40) 40
Type 2 97.37% 98.04% 100% 100% 100% 100%
question (38) 37 (51) 50 (38) 38 (52) 52 (34) 34 (40) 40
Type 3 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
question (39) 39 (51) 51 (52) 52 (52) 52 (40) 40 (40) 40
Type 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 96.36% 95.45%
question (31) 31 (30) 30 (23) 23 (22) 22 (55) 53 (44) 42
Mild AD participants: T.I., To.Is., Zs.A., H.I., moderate AD participants: K.F., K.D.
TABLE 11 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses by mild AD participants and the control group to Type 4 questions in terms of
grammatical categories.
Participant T.I. To.Is. Zs.A. H.L. Mild AD group: Control group:
n = 31 n = 30 n = 23 n = 22 total n = 106 n = 114
NON-RECURSIVE
Simple descriptive sentence 22.58% 6.67% 21.74% 4.55% 14.15% 15 14.91% 17
7 2 5 1
Simple sentence with subjunctive – – 13.04% – 2.83% 3 –
3
Simple situative statement – 20% 39.13% 27.27% 19.81% 21 30.7% 35
6 9 6
Total for non-recursive structures 22.58% 26.27% 73.91% 31.82% 36.79% 39 45.61% 52
7 8 17 7
RECURSIVE STRUCTURES
That + situative statement – – – 27.27% 5.66% 6 6.14% 7
6
That + descriptive clause 41.94% 60% 13.04% 22.73% 5 36.79% 39 40.35% 46
13 18 3
That + clause with subjunctive 35.48% 13.33% 13.04% 18.18% 20.75% 22 7.89% 9
11 4 3 4
Total for that-clauses 77.42% 73.33% 26.08% 68.18% 63.21% 67 54.39% 62
24 22 6 15
Total for situative statements – 20% 39.13% 54.55% 25.47% 27 36.84% 42
6 9 12
Total for non-situative statements 100% 24% 24 60.87% 45.45% 74.53% 79 63.16% 72
31 14 10
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6.6. Responses to Type 4 Questions:
Moderate AD Participants
The number of responses by moderate AD participants to Type 4
questions in various grammatical categories is shown inTable 12.
The data show that there is significant difference in
the proportion of situative statement responses between the
moderate AD group and the control group [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 209)
= 32.14, p < 0.001, V = 0.39]. On the other hand, there
is no significant difference in the distribution of grammatical
recursive–non-recursive structures [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 209) = 0.44,
p > 0.05, V = 0.05], which suggests that in moderate AD
participants syntactic-structural recursion is not affected.
6.7. Relevance of the Content in
Responses to Type 4 Questions
The relevance of the answer was evaluated in the context of the
stimulus picture and the question heard (cf. Figures 12–14). In
a relevant response participant answered the question and talked
about the picture, in a non-relevant response participant did not
answer the question and/or did not talk about the picture. The
performance of mild and moderate AD participants is shown in
Table 13.
Table 13 shows that the number of irrelevant responses
to Type 4 questions is significantly higher in moderate AD
participants [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 205) = 7.6, p< 0.01, V = 0.19].
7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
7.1. Recursive Sentence Embedding
The share of that-clauses jumped up in the responses to Type
4 questions for all AD groups. The ratio of recursive sentence
embedding is considerably greater in the case of Type 4 questions
than in the case of Type 1, 2 and 3 questions: see Table 14.
The distribution of grammatical recursive structures shows
significant differences among question types in the case of both
types of AD [χ2-tests, mild AD: χ2(3, N= 688) = 230.02, p< 0.001,
V = 0.58, moderate AD: χ2(3, N= 333) = 116.97, p < 0.001, V =
0.59], Table 14.
7.2. Relevance of the Content in
Responses to Type 4 Questions
Relevant and irrelevant responses to Type 4 questions: a total for
the AD groups is shown in Table 15.
7.3. Grammatical Categories of Responses
to Type 4 Questions
Within all responses given by moderate AD participants
the ratio of situative statements (4.21%) was far lower
than the ratio of situative statements (25.47%) within all
responses given by persons with mild AD. In this respect,
mild AD participants behave similarly to healthy controls
TABLE 12 | Numbers and percentages of grammatical responses by moderate AD participants and the control group to Type 4 questions in terms of
grammatical categories.
Participant K.F. K.D. Moderate AD group Control group
n = 53 n = 42 total n = 95 mean n = 114
NON-RECURSIVE
Simple descriptive sentence 18.86% 10 23.81% 10 21.05% 20 14.91% 17
Simple sentence in subjunctive 26.42% 14 7.14% 3 17.89% 17 –
Situative statement 3.77% 2 – 2.11% 2 30.7% 35
Total for grammatical non-recursive structures 49.06% 26 30.95% 13 41.05% 39 45.61% 52
RECURSIVE STRUCTURES
That + situative statement – 4.76% 2 2.11% 2 6.14% 7
That + descriptive clause 50.94% 27 64.29% 27 56.84% 54 40.35% 46
That + clause with subjunctive – – – 7.89% 9
Total for grammatical that-clauses: 50.94% 27 69.05% 29 58.94% 56 54.39% 62
Total for grammatical situative statements 3.78% 2 4.76% 2 4.21% 4 36.84% 42
Total for grammatical non-situative statements 96.23% 51 95.24% 40 95.79% 91 63.16% 72
TABLE 13 | Relevance of the content in the responses to Type 4 questions by mild and moderate AD participants: numbers and percentages of relevant
and irrelevant responses.
Participant H.L. To.Is. T.I. Zs.A. K.F. K.D.
(mild) (mild) (mild) (mild) (moderate) (moderate)
n = 22 n = 30 n = 31 n = 23 n = 55 n = 44
Relevant responses 86.36% 76.67% 70.97% 82.61% 56.36% 65.91%
(The participant answered the question and talked
about the picture)
19 23 22 19 31 29
Non-relevant responses 13.64% 3 23.33% 29.03% 17.39% 43.64% 34.09%
(The participant did not answer the question and/or
did not talk about the picture)
7 9 4 24 15
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TABLE 14 | Numbers and percentages of grammatically well-formed recursive (R) vs. non-recursive (NR) answers by mild vs. moderate AD participants
vs. the control group in Type 1–4 questions.
Question Mild AD: 4 participants Moderate AD: 2 participants Control group: 6 participants
Recursive Non-recursive Recursive Non-recursive Recursive Non-recursive
Type 1 question 1% 2 99% 197 1.25% 1 98.75% 79 0% 0 100% 323
Type 2 question 6.7% 12 93.3% 167 2.7% 2 97.3% 72 3.02% 10 96.97% 321
Type 3 question 12.37% 24 87.63% 170 12.5% 10 87.5% 70 14.62% 50 85.38% 292
Type 4 question 63.21% 67 36.79% 39 58.95% 56 41.05% 39 54.39% 62 45.61% 52
TABLE 15 | Relevant and irrelevant responses to Type 4 questions.
Participant Mild AD Moderate AD
n = 106 n = 99
Relevant responses 78.3% 60.6%
(The participant answered the
question and talked about the picture)
83 60
Irrelevant responses 21.7% 39.4%
(The participant did not answer the
question and/or did not talk about the
picture)
23 39
(i.e., there is no significant difference in the distribution of
situative and non-situative statements for either group) but
moderate AD participants produce significantly fewer situative
statements than either the mild AD or the control group
(see Tables 11, 12, 14).
We also found that mild AD participants tend to produce
a high number of situative statements and a low number
of irrelevant answers whereas moderate AD participants
tend to produce a low number of situative statements
and a high number of irrelevant answers (results are not
significant, Pearson’s correlation, r(6) = −0.6927, p > 0.05). See
Tables 11–13, 15.
8. AN ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENT: THE
TWO MODERATE AD PARTICIPANTS
In our tests exploring recursive clause embedding abilities,
the grammatical responses given by Broca’s and Wernicke’s
aphasics did not contain any instance of wrong ToM reasoning.
On the other hand, the number of instances of false ToM
reasoning occurring in responses given by the moderate
AD group was significantly higher than in responses given
by mild AD participants. So, in the case of moderate AD
participants, we used another kind of test to see if this
was a task specific effect—for instance, whether a potential
limitation of the visual perception system in moderate AD
caused the ToM deficit appearing in linguistic responses (the
participants had to answer questions concerning photographs
they were looking at)—or if the ToM limitation shows up
across task types in moderate AD. We therefore administered
first and second-order false belief tests to our two moderate
AD subjects.
8.1. Participants
The two native Hungarian speaking moderate AD participants
were involved. They were categorized as moderate based on the
degree of their dementia with the help of the MMSE (Folstein
et al., 1975; Tariska et al., 1990) and the ADAS-Cog test (Rosen
et al., 1984). The participants met the diagnostic requirements
of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and of
ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) for AD. See some details in Table 8
above.
8.2. Materials and Design
We used a first-order (six sentences long) and a second-order
(eight sentences long) false belief test following Youmans and
Bourgeois (2010). In this experiment we read out two stories
to the participants, while they were able to follow it also
from the text which we handed over to them, following these
instructions:
“Here is a very short story I want to give you. I will read the story
out loud. Please, read this same story from this text to yourself while
I read it out. Please, make sure you pay close attention to it, because
when I’m done reading it, I will ask you a few questions about the
story, which you should remember. Do you have any questions?”
We asked four questions in connection with each story,
which we also handed over in writing to the moderate
AD participants. The questions focused on the following: 1.
false beliefs, 2. comprehension, 3. remembering, 4. general
conclusions.
The research has been approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the Research Institute for Linguistics of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
(30/7/2014). All participants provided consent before
participating in the test sessions.
8.3. Results
8.3.1. First-Order False Belief Story
John and his wife Margaret arrive home. They park their car in
the driveway in front of their house. Margaret goes upstairs to
take a shower. After Margaret goes upstairs, John decides that it is
going to rain. John moves the car into the garage. Later, Margaret
remembers she is out of milk, and decides to drive to the grocery
store (Youmans and Bourgeois, 2010; Hoffmann et al., 2011)
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False belief: Where will Margaret look first for the car?
(Expected response: driveway, outside, in front of house)
K.F.’s response: driveway K.D.’s response: outside, driveway
Comprehension: Where is the car at the end of the story?
(Expected response: in the garage)
K.F.’s response: in the garage K.D.’s response: in the garage
Memory: Where was the car parked at the beginning of the
story? (Expected response: driveway, in front of house)
K.F.’s response: driveway K.D.’s response: driveway, outside
Physical inference: If it rains, will it rain on the car? (Expected
response: no)
K.F.’s response: no K.D.’s response: not, it will not
8.3.2. Second-Order False Belief Story
Mary wants to hide Peter’s birthday present. She wants to trick
Peter, so he won’t be able to find his present. Mary says, “Peter,
close your eyes, I’m going to hide your present here in the living
room.” When Peter closes his eyes, Mary runs quietly up the stairs.
At the top of the stairs Mary knocks some dirt out of a potted plant.
Upstairs, Mary goes into the bedroom to hide Peter’s present. But
Peter peeked! He sawMary climb the stairs and go into the bedroom
with his present (Youmans and Bourgeois, 2010; Hoffmann et al.,
2011).
False belief: Where does Mary think that Peter thinks his
present is hidden? (Expected response: in the living room. The
incorrect answers are marked in red.)
False belief: Where does Mary think that Peter thinks his
present is hidden? (Expected response: in the living room. The
incorrect answers are marked in red.)
K.F.’s response: ∗ upstairs K.D.’s response: ∗ in the bedroom
Comprehension: Where is the present hidden? (Expected
response: in the bedroom, upstairs.)
K.F.’s response: upstairs K.D.’s response: in the bedroom
Memory:Where doesMary tell Peter she is hiding his present?
(Expected response: in the living room, downstairs.)
K.F.’s response: well, in the living room K.D.’s response: in the
living room
Physical inference: Where would there be spilled dirt?
(Expected response: top of stairs, on the stairs, upstairs.)
K.F.’s response: upstairs K.D.’s response: top of stairs
The first-order false belief test did not present any difficulty to the
participants, who provided correct answers to all the questions.
The second-order false belief test turned out to be more difficult
for the two moderate AD participants. Despite the fact that
the participants were assisted in their remembering (in having
the text of the story in front of them), both of them provided
incorrect answers to false belief questions.
9. DISCUSSION
There was no significant difference between the mild AD group
and the control group in the proportions of replies involving
recursive sentence embedding vs. situative responses. We can
infer that inmild AD, syntactic-structural recursion is unaffected.
In the case of moderate AD group we found a significant
difference in the proportion of responses involving recursive
sentence embedding and simple situative statements: the ratio
of situational statements presupposing recursive ToM reasoning
was significantly lower than in the control group. The moderate
AD group produced significantly fewer situative statements
than the healthy control participants did [χ2-test, χ2(2, N= 209)
= 32.14, p < 0.001, V = 0.39]. On the other hand, the
share of sentences involving syntactic-structural recursion (hogy
“that”-clauses embedded) was not lower than in healthy control
responses. Additionally, we also received semantically irrelevant
responses: exhibiting irrelevant situative statements or referring
to some irrelevant parts of the picture. This finding demonstrates
that while recursive sentence embedding is unimpaired in
moderate AD, the recursive ToM reasoning can be limited.
We found that the second-order false belief test proved to
be difficult for the two moderate AD participants: they gave
the wrong answers. Their performance makes it probable that
the ToM deficit occurring in their responses given in clause
embedding tests was not exclusively a task specific effect, given
that ToM deficit showed up in another type of task, too, with the
same two moderate AD persons.
10. GENERAL DISCUSSION
10.1. Double Dissociation
In mild and moderate AD, abilities to use recursive sentence
embedding (with that-clauses embedded) remain unaffected.
ToM inferences become limited by the moderate stage of the
disease. Moderate AD participants tend to avoid simple situative
statements (that assume the state of mind of another person). The
share of irrelevent responses jumped up in the responses to Type
4 questions by moderate AD participants. Unlimited subsystem
of recursive sentence embedding and limited ToM inferences in
moderate AD: this result exhibits a pattern of dissociation.
In the case of Broca’s aphasics, limited subsystem of recursive
sentence embedding but unimpaired ToM inferences were found.
Recursive sentence embedding was substituted for by simple
clauses expressing ToM inferences.
Thus, we found double dissociation. Limited subsystem of
recursive sentence embedding and unimpaired ToM inferences
in Broca’s aphasia as opposed to unlimited recursive sentence
embedding and limited ToM inferences in AD: this is a pattern
of double dissociation. One the one hand, this finding supports
theories (e.g., Zimmerer and Varley, 2010) claiming that the
specific recursive rules are distinct in adults. On the other hand,
the above-sketched double dissociation may yield a relevant
problem for theories claiming that recursive sentence embedding
is based on ToM recursion. If this were the case, ToM limitations
should have caused syntactic disturbances in the moderate AD
group, yet we did not find any.
10.2. The dissociation of syntactic-structural recursion and
ToM inferences can be observed in Wernicke’s aphasia to a lesser
degree; this is in harmony with earlier observations that associate
limited syntactic abilities primarily with Broca’s aphasia and
consider grammatical errors committed by Wernicke’s aphasics
as consequences of the impairment of some lexical processes.
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10.3. The Emergence of a Compensatory
Strategy
The Broca’s aphasic participants use recursive ToM inferences
(in situative statements of simple syntactic structure) in
exactly the cases where the structure of Type 4 questions
would have potentially supported answers with recursive
sentence embedding. By using this compensation strategy, they
successfully resolved the task. Therefore, the dissociated recursive
subsystems are not totally independent of one another: the
impairment of one may trigger the use of another one as a
substitution mechanism or repair strategy; they are utilizable in
strategies such that “one may replace the other.”
We found that operations of recursive sentence embedding
remained intact in mild and moderate AD. On the other hand,
in the moderate phase of the disease, the AD participants gave
wrong answers with respect to other people’s intentions and
avoided situative statements carrying ToM inferences. Retained
syntactic abilities of this group failed to offer any compensation
strategy to help them solve the tasks in the test. There was no
linguistic substitution mechanism or repair strategy available for
them.
10.4. Compensatory Strategy: The “Two
Systems” Approach
Our participants were given complex tasks in the test.
Photographs of real life situations were presented and various
types of questions were asked about them. Participants had to
respond to questions by judging the situation seen in the photo.
This required their using complex systems in complex cognitive
domains.
Some researchers propose a dual process theory for operations
in complex cognitive domains. For the neural base of recursion
and computing hierarchical structures, Friederici et al. (2011)
propose that there are two parallel computational systems
processing hierarchical structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex.
One system which follows the posterior-to-anterior gradient
is determined by cognitive control. This is a less automatic
system processing complex sequences in different domains,
among others in some non-language domains and giving rise
to activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 47/45a and
10). Another system processing the recursive syntactic hierarchy
of natural language activates the more posterior regions of the
inferior frontal gyrus, covering Broca’s area. This system is highly
automatic in adults. “Language processing in adults is highly
automatic and does not appear to be very challenging for the
brain, even when the sequences to be processed are hierarchically
complex [...] humans are predetermined to compute linguistic
recursion, with BA 44/45p being the neural correlate of this
showing its functional primacy in adult brain” (Friederici et al.,
2011, p. 101).
The two systems that process hierarchical structures differ in
their specific domain and the degree of cognitive control; namely,
the first system is less automatic, while the second system is
highly automatic.
The two systems approach is also proposed in the study of
ToM (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Cohen and German, 2009;
Strickland et al., 2014). According to Apperly and Butterfill,
2009), ToM operations involve at least two types of system. One
type of system is quick, highly automatic, cognitively efficient, but
limited and inflexible. This early-developing system has a central
role in guiding online social interaction and simple everyday
communication. Another type of system is highly flexible but
cognitively inefficient, and requires more cognitive control.
This later-developing flexible cognitive system is necessary for
solving false-belief tasks and enable adults to perform explicit
ToM reasoning in complex social interaction. For instance, it
“enable[s] adults to engage in top-down guidance of social
interaction (such as anticipating what the audience of a lecture
might know or working out how one misjudged the audience
afterward) and in explicit reasoning about the causes and
justification of mental states (as in everyday practical reasoning
or jurisprudence)” (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009, p. 966). The two
separate systems co-exist in adults.
Strickland et al. (2014) presented studies on the link between
syntax and intentionality judgements. They found two types of
system in the intentionality judgements. A fast-acting reasoning
system for automatically calculating others’ mental states was
found. This system acts on syntactic-structural information
showing an automatic link between on-line language processing
and ToM.When a more complicated design was employed in the
experiments they found another way to generate intentionality
judgements: this was a slower, deliberate, non-automatic system
that was based on a deeper, more reflective understanding of the
real-world events that particular sentences refer to. The syntactic
biases did not affect intentionality judgements or influenced them
less in this second case, and the event referred to by the sentence
was considered in a deeper, reflective manner. According to
Strickland et al. (2014), one possible way to interpret their results
is the “two systems” framework.
10.5. We assume that the “two systems” approach can be
applied in the interpretation of compensatory strategies shown by
aphasic participants. In this case, the relevant two systems differ
in their specific tasks, domain, and in the degree of automation.
Recursively embedded clauses may trigger highly automatic
computational operations in healthy participants. This system is
impaired in Broca’s aphasia. On the other hand, to solve the tasks
in our tests, the participants also needed to perform a complex
ToM reasoning in a type of recursive “logic” that was unimpaired
and they used less automatic and more reflexive operations
requiring more cognitive control. The complexity of the tasks
in our experiment (participants had to judge a real-life situation
shown in a picture and respond to a specific question they
heard concerning the situation), compounded by impairments
in recursively embedded clauses, triggered the application of
compensatory strategies.
Broca’s aphasics understood the questions on the mental
states of the characters seen in the pictures (they did not
give any irrelevant situative statement response). They were
less impaired in sentence comprehension; they might realize
potential recursion in the meaning of the question and the
potential answer. On the other hand, the proper linguistic
production side was not available for them. Their repair strategies
were based on their knowledge of social contexts and their
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 18 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 405
Bánréti et al. Recursive Subsystems
pragmatic aspects, as well as their accessible ToM system. In
ToM responses, a comprehensive semantic and morphological
use of the feature “first person” was discernible. Broca’s aphasics,
using their own minds as models, carried out a simulation
and analysis of the mental states of persons seen in the test
picture, and selected their conclusions from among those states.
In the content of the responses, activation of a simulation-
basedmindreading (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006,
2012) was apparent, and the net result was implemented in
brief, simple, non-recursive linguistic forms. In answering the
questions of the test (What may X be saying/thinking/reminding
Y of/asking Y to do in the picture), the participants offered
situative statements that contained a simulation and analysis of
the social situations, facial expressions, and emotions shown in
the pictures, and the selected conclusions based on them. These
results support the simulation model of mindreading (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006, 2012). Such working of the
ToM system required significant cognitive control, too.
The above compensation strategy involves a switch from
the impaired, highly automatic system to the unimpaired, non-
automatic or less automatic system. Broca’s aphasics employed
highly reflexive ToM reasoning that required significant
cognitive control in the framework of recursive “logic.” That
strategy made it possible for them to solve the tasks in the test.
In moderate AD participants we found a reverse construction,
in that automatic operations of recursive sentence embedding
were well-functioning, there was no need for a repair strategy in
this respect. Moderate AD participants successfully processed the
meaning of the questions on the mental states of the characters
seen in the picture. Linguistic questions were understood. But
they were often unable to select, identify and interpret the
relevant parts of the event seen in the picture from the point
of view of the mental state of the characters seen in the
picture. Some visually real but non-relevant parts of the photos
were mentioned that had no connections to the essence of
the situation and intentions of the characters in the photos
(cf. Figure 13, for instance). The less automatic, reflexive ToM
reasoning was impaired in moderate AD participants (This is
compatible with the data suggesting that our two moderate AD
participants exhibited poor performance in a second-order false
belief test). Persons with moderate Alzheimer’s disease had no
linguistic mechanism at their disposal to compensate for that
deficiency even though they were otherwise quite able to produce
syntactically complex sentences.
10.6. The production differences between aphasic and AD
participants observed in our tests are explained by the fact that
we do not seem to have to do with a general recursive operation
whose application may be impaired or remain intact at various
levels; rather, we encounter separate recursive operations bound
to subsystems that may be selectively impaired. In this case,
the recursive operations are subsystem-specific. However, these
operations are not independent of one another; this is shown
by the available compensatory strategy. We have found that,
whenever one of the recursive operations bound to a subsystem is
impaired, another set of operations of another subsystem enters
the scene, also involving recursion, as part of compensatory
strategy. The main point of compensatory strategies followed
by aphasics was a kind of change from an impaired automatic
linguistic system to an unimpaired non-automatic ToM
system.
11. CONCLUSIONS
The double dissociation of recursive sentence embedding and
ToM recursion between the group of Broca’s aphasics and
people with moderate AD may pose relevant problems for
theories claiming that recursive sentence embedding is based on
ToM recursion. In the moderate AD group recursive sentence
embedding was almost totally unimpaired while ToM inferences
had severe limitations. These limitations did not cause any
syntactic disturbances in the moderate AD group.
Broca’s aphasics arrived at the right ToM inferences. They
creatively hit upon the simple non-recursive linguistic form and
the corresponding ToM perspective using “first person singular”
reference to an imagined “ego” of the person in the picture as
simulated by the aphasic participant whose combination made
it possible to express recursive inferences in a non-recursive
linguistic form. The change from third to first person represented
a kind of perspective embedding by Broca’s participants. A
deficit in the subsystem of recursive sentence embedding was
compensated for by perspective embedding in the ToM system.
In this connection, our results support the simulation model of
mind reading.
In Broca’s aphasia and moderate AD, we have found separate
recursive operations bound to subsystems. The nature of their
interrelations makes it possible for one subsystem that remained
unimpaired to compensate for the other’s limitations in Broca’s
aphasia.
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